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ERIC M FREEDMAN

American Libel Law 1825-1896: A Qualified Privilege
For Public Affairs?
On March 9, 1964, in The New York Times Company u Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court
gave its sanction to a
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice" - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'

This doctrine has governed virtually all subsequent
decisions in libel cases.2 The Sullivan ruling has
been seen as introducing new principles into the
field; 3 it has been denounced as providing "virtually
a license to lie"; 4 and it called forth a promise of
corrective legislation from President Nixon. 5 Nonetheless, the issue in Sullivan, the standards by
which it was resolved, and the resolution itself all have
considerable precedent in cases from nineteenthcentury America. 6
This paper will seek to explore some of those
precedents. It will try to focus as narrowly as possible on the question: what was the law in America
between 1825 and 1896 with respect to civil actions
brought by public figures to recover for the written
publication of defamatory falsehoods?' As background, however, we shall begin by defining a few
key terms and glancing at some major developments in this area between 1787 and 1825.
A widely-cited textbook writer offered this definition of libel in 1887:
Any written words . . . which impute to the plaintiff that he
has been guilty of any crime, fraud, dishonesty, immorality,
vice or dishonorable conduct, or has been accused or suspected of any such misconduct; or which suggest that the
plaintiff is suffering from any infectious disorder; or which
have a tendency to injure him in his office, profession or
calling. And so, too, are all words which hold the plaintiff up
to contempt, hatred, scorn or ridicule, and which, be they
engendering as evil opinion of him in the minds of rightthinking men, tend to deprive him of friendly intercourse or
society.8
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Each jurisdiction had its own particular rules, butin
general if the words did not fall within this description no action could be maintained.
Even if they did, however, there were several
defenses available. One was that the words were
true.9 Another, and the one with which we shall be
principally concerned, was that the words fell under
a privilege, that-is, an exemption from liability for the .. . publishing of defamatory words concerning another, based on the fact that the
statement was made in the performance of a duty, political,
judicial, social, or personal.10

Such an exception could come about in several
ways."
One important line of early decisions established
the doctrine that there was no liability for false
assertions in petitions to forums competent to redress the grievances complained of, or in statements
made in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
For example, in 1802 the Supreme Court of Vermont set aside a $1 verdict recovered by Ebenezer
Harris for a petition to the state legislature which
protested against his appointment as justice of the
peace on the grounds that he was "heinously a
peace-breaker," and did "not possess . . . uprightness .

.

. and integrity."'

2

The court ruled that
[an absolute and unqualified indemnity from all responsibility in the petitioners is indispensable, [and concluded:] [t]he
court, therefore, consider that no action can be maintained
for a libel upon a petition for redress of grievances, whether
the subject matter of the petition be true or false, simply
upon its being preferred to . . . the General Assembly or

disclosed to any of its members.13

And in 1815, a South Carolina court held that the
electorate was the proper tribunal to judge the qualifications of a candidate for its suffrage.14
The earliest cases were also liberal in regard to
words published in judicial proceedings. For example, in 1807 a witness brought a libel suit against a
defendant who had said in court upon hearing his
testimony, "That is a lie and I can prove it." The
New Jersey Supreme Court took only one paragraph to dispose of the complaint, saying: "[tihe
words . . . were spoken in a court of law . .. in a
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course of justice ... they are not actionable." 5 But,

although mainly in dicta, it was generally agreed
that malice would defeat the privilege in both kinds
of action.16
Since participants in the legal system after 1825
did not know that to a future writer they would be in
a different class from ones before that date, perhaps
it is not too surprising that these same concepts
continued to play an influential role in the development of the law during the final three-quarters of the
century.
A threshold question that arises in discussing the
libel of public figures is - who is a public figure? A
most obvious example - and one which virtually all
courts recognized, whatever degree of privilege
they granted - is a person regularly employed by
the government.' 7 Candidates for elective offices
were also widely held to be public figures.' 8
The class of public figures, however, was by no
means limited to public officers or candidates. A
local chairman of a political party was held to fall
within the class,' 9 as were architects under government contract. 20 The Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut found privileged an attack on "[tithe
remarkable letter of Albert H Walker, giving his socalled reasons for falsely asserting that Mr Lounsbury's nomination was secured by corrupt
means."2 ' The court agreed with defense counsel
that his client "did not refer to the plaintiff otherwise
than as a political supporter of a political claim". 22
But, although they frequently were, public figures
did not need to be political ones. There was much to
support the statement of a leading textbook writer
of the time: "[w]hen a man comes forth in any way,
and acquires for a time a quasi-public postion, he
cannot escape the necessary consequence - the
free expression of public opinion." 23 Attorneys in
general were held to be within the class, 24 as was an
allegedly corrupt customs house broker,25 a financier said to be plotting the takeover of a railway, 26 a
lecturer and author, 27 and a man who claimed that a
newspaper's harsh comments had cost him the
$30,000 sale of a statue he was exhibiting.28
The range of publications held actionable was
similarly broad. The most generally accepted rule
seems to have been that an action could be maintained "if the published charge is such as, if
believed, would naturally tend to expose the plaintiff to public hatred contempt or ridicule, or deprive
him of the benefits of public confidence and social
intercourse."29

This doctrine was particularly useful to legislators
charged with corruption which fell short of legal
bribery.30 A frequently-cited example was that of a
state senator in Missouri named McGinnis. A St
Louis newspaper published the following: "[t]he distribution of the $50,000 slush fund sent here by the
liquor interests may enable Senator McGinnis to
make good his boast that... he would defeat [a
licensing bill] in the senate." 3 ' The defendants
successfully demurred below on the ground that
the publication did not impute bribery; but the state
supreme court overruled the demurrer with the
words:
The court will not make strained inferences in favor of those
who. . . touch with flippant lightness upon so sacred a thing
as private character.... And the penalties which the law
provides for such acts cannot be defeated by evasions,
32
however skillfull, or thwarted by artifices, however subtle.

Charges which tended to injure public-figure plaintiffs in their callings were also frequently held to
provide a basis for bringing libel actions.33 Some
jurisdictions, however, followed the narrower rule
announced by the Supreme Court of Alabama in an
1835 slander case: "Actionable words . . . in reference to . .. all public functionaries .. . must point to
previous official misconduct, implying criminality or
moral turpitude." 34
In actions brought by officeholders, it was sometimes asserted that the test was whether the
charge, if true, would be a cause for removal.35
Similarly, one case held that the standard to be
applied to an action brought by a candidate was
whether the electorate's belief in the charge would
cost him votes.36
Most courts adopted "the opinion that the official
act of a public functionary may be freely criticized,"3 7 but drew a line between such comments
and those which "asperse[d] the personal character
of a public man."38
This distinction was clearly made in the 1893 case
of Buckstaff u Viall. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that it might be privileged to write of a state
senator named Buckstaff: "His majesty Bucksniff,
under the pretense of consulting some of his
friends, who are a number of well-known little political gods of Oshkosh, intends to defeat these
amendments by procrastination and delay." 39 But
the court labelled, "gibes, taunts and contemptuous
and insulting phrases . . . not privileged, by any

principle of law," such as "[e]loquent, and beautiful
senatorial god . .. lock with they mighty right eye

alone. . . and ... reconsider they determination to
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defeat the laws,"40 where it was averred that the
words referred to a paralysis of one side of the
plaintiffs body.
The application of this same distinction to candidates for public office, however, presented some
difficulties Courts frequently made such statements
as:
Let the . .. public record of a candidate, so far as it may
affect his fitness or qualification for office be the subject of
free and vigorous comment ... but when his private life is

assailed by imputing to him a crime, let his accusers ...
prove the truth of the charges.41

This led to both a logical and a practical problem. In
logic, it is hard to maintain the moral character
which is revealed by a criminal conviction "is something aside from, and not entering into or influencing, ... public conduct." 42 Practically, therefore, a
critic could make a charge against a candidate, such
as drunkenness, which would be defamatory of an
officer unless specifically tied to his performance of
official duties. Indeed, a defendant was convicted of
criminal libel in Massachussetts for making comments about an incumbent sheriff, who refused to
declare whether or not he would run again, which
could permissibly have been made of the same man
as candidate.4
Although defendants routinely tried to advance
the argument that the public was the proper tribunal to judge public men, and hence a privilege attached to utterances to it, the cases decided during
our period did not go nearly so far. They generally
held not more than that a non-malicious complaint
about a public officer to his governmental superior,44 about a member to a professional organization, 45 or the solicitation of signatures for such
complaints,' enjoyed a privilege. The courts, however, rejected the claim of such a privilege for public
complaints made against an appointed officer,47 a
candidate for appointment, 48 or during governmental hearings not adequately judicial in character.49
There was wide agreement that the privilege
could be defeated by malice; but there was wide
disagreement on the precise definition of such malice. Most courts accepted, at least in theory, the
distinction between actual and legal malice stated
by a judge in Philadelphia:
Malice, in fact, as it is called - or actual malice, is what is
understood by that word in its ordinary use, ill will,desire to
to injury... Implied malice, as it is sometimes, called or inferential malice, hasa much broader scope. It means doing a
thing without lawful justification or excuse.50

Some courts held, without defining their terms

more explicitly, that actual malice would defeat the
conditional privilege of complaining to a proper tribunal.5 ' Others inferred malice from the absence of
probable cause for making the complaint. 52 One
court held that the existence of either of these two
conditions would defeat the privilege;53 another,
that the plaintiff needed show the defendant's
knowledge that the charges were false;54 and yet
another, that the defendant's desire for gain was
central.55 Perhaps all these cases can be shoehomed into upholding a loose version of the actual
malice criterion, but it would be more accurate to
say that fixed standards had not evolved.
In dealing with comments about public figures,
many courts insisted on the central distinction
between fact and opinion - and normally went on
to hold the latter privileged, however harsh, as long
as the former was correct.5 6 For example, in one
federal case which was upheld on appeal, it was
said:
The jury were instructed that ... the distinction between

comment or criticism and allegations of fact could not be too
clearly borne in mind; that the facts which gave rise to the
comments must be proved substantially asalleged, and that
.. . in so far as the publication sued upon fell within the limits
of criticism and comment, it was privileged.57

To fall within the rule, courts said that the criticism
had to be directed at the public activity of the public
man.58

Despite all of these problems, many courts had to
wrestle directly with the question of whether or not
there existed a Sullivan-type privilege for defamatory statements of fact. Cases were decided each
way, and it is difficult to judge which view was more
widely held.59 There was, of course, little difficultyin
finding for plaintiffs in cases were actual malice was
shown,60 as even those who wer inclined to grant
the privilege extended it no further than to mistatements made in good faith; after all, the only question
was whether a new class of occasions would come
within the well-known rules of qualified privilege.
Many courts said no. Their reasoning generally
paralleled that of the Supreme Court of Michigan:
To hold that false charges of a defamatory character, made
against a candidate, are privileged as matters of law, ifmade
in good faith . . . seems tome ... a most pernicious doctrine.
It would deter all ... honorable men from accepting the
candidacy . . . Besides . . . the voters are deceived by

falsehood .. .and so two wrongs are perpetrated: one upon
the candidate, the other in misleading the voter.6'

The majority of courts which denied the privilege
did so more or less unqualifiedly, 62 although there is
an occasional suggestion that - "Ifstatements,
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though false, are published in good faith .. . dam-

ages may be reduced to a minimum." 3
There were, however, some jurisdictions which
placed limits on their denials. There are some cases
which seem to have turned on the fact that a crime
was charged. 64 A smaller number of opinions seem
to suggest that the privilege was refused in the case
at hand because the publication concerned the public man's private character. 65
There seems to have been less variation among
the courts which granted the privilege. They virtually all agreed that protection should be extended
only to those publications made with probable
cause for believing their truth." The judges on this
side of the privilege issue showed less inclination to
flights of rhetoric than their oppositely-minded colleagues, but their general public policy argument
seems to have been that the granting of the privilege
was essential to enable people to judge officers and
candidates, and expose "all the rogues and thieves,
who may by their own cunning or the negligence of
the people, get into public office." 67 The Supreme
Court of Texas, for example, said:
In the exercise of this high and important power of selecting
their agents to administer for them the affairs of government, are the people to be denied the right of discussion...?

Usually it is by such discussion .. . that the people obtain the

requisite information to enable them intelligently to exercise
the elective franchise. Any abridgement of this right ...
would be extremely unwise.68

The Supreme Court of Michigan added the argument that the rule was necessary to prevent the
contempt for law that would follow from having "the
reckless libeler . . . ranked by the law in the same

company with respectable and public-spirited

journalists."6 9
While it is difficult to come to a conclusion as to
the precise status of the Sullivan privilege during
the latter part of the nineteenth century, it is plain
that the "license to lie" was not invented in 1964;
and the existence of a long line of cases in this area
should perhaps be of interest to historians as well as
lawyers. Libel cases of this nature are peculiarly
political, 70 and might well be studied not only on an
individual basis - with a view to the interaction
between political and judicial opinions 7' - but in
groups, as a rough reflection of political cohesion
within a given geographical jurisdiction. For example, there seems to have been a sharp drop in the
number of libel cases in the ten years on either side
of the Civil War; and of those which did take place, a
substantial portion dealt with sectional issues.72 U
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New York Times Company v Sullivan 376 US 255, 280-1
(1964).
A good summary of post-Sullivan decisions is at Recent
Decisions, 20 JPUL 601 (1971). See also Case Note 40
FordLRev 651 (1972).
Carey v Hume Civ No 71-1736 (DC Cir January 28 1974)
at 6, concurring opinion of Judge MacKinnon at 17.
Anthony Lewis Nixon And A Right Of Reply NY Times
March 24 1974 sec 4, at 2, col 4.
Id.
See Atwater v Morning News Company 34 A 865, 866
(1896).
But there are some pitfalls in this narrow undertaking.
During some of this period, especially its early segment,
the law did not categorize actions precisely as we do.
Hence, some consideration of criminal libel and of slander
cases is necessary to a proper treatment of our subject,
and they are identified in the text. The problem becomes
clear when we consider how slowly the distinction
between written and unwritten defamation emerged in the
United States. As early as 1637, we find the statement in
Europe, Perezius, Praelec, in Cod (1637 ed) lib 9 tit 1(my
translation from the Latin):
The written type of injury is a more serious kind,
because it remains longer in the sight of men. For
voices are easily forgotten, but written letters remain

8
9

and wander far and wide through many hands, and the
shame lasts as long as memory endures.
In 1812, Lord Mansfield - albeit with great reluctance upheld the distinction: Thorley v Lord Kerry 4 Taun 354,
366 (1812). In the United States it was not uncommon to
find such phrases as "slander, written or unwritten": Turrill v Dolloway 26 Wend 383, 396 (NY 1841) (concurring
opinion of Senator Lee). Cf Tillotson v Cheetham 2 Johns
63, 74 (NY 1806). The question was still being discussed as
late as 1878: Tillson v Robbins, 68 Me 295, 298. See also
Pollard v Lyon, 91 US (1 Otto) 225 (1875). An excellent
discussion of what constitutes slander is to be found at
226. See also Johnson v Stebbings 5 Ind 364, 366. (The
headnote to this case inaccurately, if humorously, summarizes it as holding: "To sustain an action for libel, it is not
necessary that the words should be libelous": id at 364.
"Slanderous" is meant). See generally W Blake Odgers I
The Law Of Libel And Slander (from the second English
edition; Philadelphia, 1887) 267 and RC Donnelly History
Qf Defamation 1949 WisLRev 99 (1949).
Odgers Law, supra note 7 at 19-20.
The fact that the allegedly defamatory words were true
was almost universally regarded as a complete defense to
a libel action in the US at least as early as 1787. But see
Romayne v Duane 20 FedCas 1140 (PennCC 1814).
Duane was editor of the "Aurora," a highly partisan
Republican newspaper. His activities in this connection
twice made him the subject of sedition actions, and it is

CHITTY'S LAW JOURNAL/VOL. 30 APRIL 1982(117

possible that political considerations were behind the
court's ruling in this case. See Dumas Malone ed 5 Dictionary of American Biography (New York 1930) at 467. (This
set is hereinafter cited as DAB). See also 16 DAB 127, and
2 DAB 390. On truth, see also Johnson v St. Louis Dispatch Company 2 MoAppRep 565, 570.
Despite the recognition of the truth defense, however,
the road to establishing such a justification was often
strewn with technical obstacles. Defendants were often
held strictly to proof of the precise words published. See
Frederitze v Odenwalder 7 Penn (2 Yeates) 243 (1797);
Kerr v Force 3 DC (3 Craunch CC) 8, 14 FedCas386. UQ
Adams had endorsed the allegedly forged note in this case.
Cf Robert H Phelps and E Douglas Hamilton Libel 110
(New York 1966). This is an excellent practical manual on
where the law stands today. See also Andrews v Vanduzer
11 Johns 38 (NY 1814). The standard of proof required
was sometimes that the establishment of the charge be,as
the Kerr court put it, "certain to a certain intent." Good
examples are Beniss v Brooks 8 Johns 356 (NY 1811) and
Maybee v Avery 18 Johns 352 (NY 1820), although both
cases were ultimately decided for the defendants.
Moreover, the attempt at justification could be legally
dangerous. For one thing, it could be regarded as proof of
publication. See Samuel v Bond 16 Ky 158 (1812) and
Jackson v Stetson, 15 Mass 49 (1818). Massachussetts
changed this rule by statute in 1827. See Clyde Augustus
Duniway The Develpment Of The Freedom Of The Press
In Massachusetts 159 (New York 1969), and Hix v Drury
22 Mass (5Pick) 296,303. More seriously, an unsuccessful
justification attempt was often considered a seriousaggravation of the original offense. Examples are: Clark v Binney 19 Mass (2Pick) 113, 121 (1824); Wilkinson v Palmer
Tapp 66, 69 (Ohio 1816); Alderman v French 18 Mass (1
Pick) 1,9(1822). The same rule is stated at Joseph Chitty 1
A Treatise On Pleading 487 (New York 1809). This is an
excellent volume for the guidance of the modern reader.
See also Downing v Brown 3 Col 571, 596 (1877).
Some jurisdictions, however, adopted the rule that an
attempt to justify would not be aggravation if made ingood
faith, eg Upton v Hume 24 Ore 420, 437 (1893). See also
King v Root 4 Wend 113, 150-1 (NY 1829) (only aggravation if known false); Sweeney v Baker 13 WVa 158, 206
(1878) (only aggravation if unsustained by evidence). See
also Dolloway v Turrill 26 Wend 383, 390 (NY 1841)
(separate opinion of Senator Lee).
In any event, it was well established that the truth must
be pleaded specially in order to avoid surprising the plaintiff with such evidence at trial. See Barns v Webb Company
34 A 865, 869 (Conn 1896). Even if the only purpose of
introducing evidence of truth was to mitigate damages, it
was still not allowed in under the general issue. See Else v
Ferris Anthon's NP 36 (NY 1808); Samuel v Bond 16 Ky
158, 159 (1812); Shepard v Merrill 13 Johns 475 (NY 1816).
Cf Cooke v O'Brien 2 Cranch CC 17, 6 FedCas 438
(DCCC 1810).
But courts generally did allow a defendant to introduce
in mitigation evidence which showed his reasons for
believing his charge at the time he made it, provided that
such evidence was not so strong as to amount to a justification: eg Treat v Browning 4 Conn 408, 418 (1822). The
rule was changed in New York by statute in 1849 to permit
the introduction of mitigating evidence regardless of its

weight. Bush v Prosser 11 NY (1 Kernan) 347,354-5 (1854).
See also Hamilton v Eno 81 NY 116, 128 (1880).
10 Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary 1360
(revised fourth edition St Paul 1968).
Most of the following material on early libel law was originally collected for a course in American Constitutional
History taught by Professor Louis H Pollak. See generally
Donnelly, History, 100-119. The discussion in the text of
the development of civil libel law before our period isby no
means intended to obscure the fact that by far the greatest
number of developments in the field at that time took place
on the criminal side. The most important occurrence was
the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798. 1Stat 596. It would
be hard to deny that the Act led to widespread contemporary abuses. See James Morton Smith The Sedition Law,
Free Speech, And The American Political Process 9
Wm&MQ 504 (1952). See also the charge to the jury in US
v Cooper 25 FedCas 631, 640-1 (PennCC 1800), and the
account of the case of Representative Lyons in Francis
Wharton State Trials of the United States During the
Administrations of Washington and Adams 333-44 (Philadelphia, 1849), also In Re Lyons 15 FedCas 1183. Cf US v
Callender 25 FedCas 239 (VaCC 1800), Wharton 688; US
v Haswell 26 FedCas 218 (VtCC 1800), Wharton 684.
Nevertheless, modern scholars seem generally to agree
that: "Despite these prosecutions, the repressive impact
of the Sedition Act has been exaggerated." Leonard W
Levy Judgments 164 (Chicago 1972). The point is made
more strongly at Stanley Nider Katz ed A Brief Narrative
Of The Case And Trial Of John Peter Zenger (Cambridge
Mass 1963).
Sullivan specifically declared the Sedition Act unconstitutional at 276, saying: "The attack on its validity has
carried the day in the court of history." For a comment on
the implications of this, see Harry Kalven Jr The New
York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning Of
The First Amendment" 1964 SCtRev 191, 204-5, 209.
For the view that the federal constitution bars the
national government from proceeding against seditious
libel at all, see: [George Hay], Two Essays On liberty Of
The Press (New York 1970); reprints of essays from 1799
and 1803); The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 in
Johnathan Elliot comp, The Debates . . . on The Adoption
of the Federal Constitution . . . (Washington 1836) 540-1:

Abrams v US 250 US 616, 630 (dissenting opinion of Mr
Justice Holmes); Charles Warren, The Early Law Of
Criminal Libel In Massachusetts, XXVII MassLQ 10
(1942); 0 John Rogge The First And The Fifth 35 (New
York 1971). For the opposite pointof view, see Leonard W
Levy Freedom Of Speech And Press In Early American
History: Legacy Of Suppression, preface to the Torchbook Edition at 1 (New York 1963).
Some of the most important English precedents, including the trials of John Wilkes and the seven bishops, The
Law Of Libels (London 1765). The volume also containsan
exhaustive discussion of libel law as it related to number 38
of "The North Britain." The main controversy in England
was over the relative roles of the court and the jury. See:
Joseph Towers Observations On The Rights And Duty Of
Juries In Trials For Libel (London 1784); Francis Maseres
An Inquiry Into The Extent Of The Power Of Juries On
Trials .. . for ... Libels (London, 1785) and Another Letter
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To Mr Almon, In Matter Of Libel (London, 1770); 32 Geo
III c60 (Fox's Act). In the US, the question usually caused
little trouble. See: Genet v Mitchell 7 Johns 120 (NY
1810): Vigours v Palmer 1 Browne 40 (Penn 1807); Dexter
v Spear 7 FedCas 624 (RICC 1825); Levy Legacyat 28. But
consider the colloquy between Judge Chase and counsellor Wirt in US v Callender 25 FedCas 239, 253 (VaCC
1800).
12 Harris v Huntington 2 Tyler 129, 130-1 (Vt 1802).
13 Id at 139, 146. For the further development of this doctrine, see: Reid v Delorme 2 Brev 76 (SC 1806) (material
defamatory of third party); Thorn v Blanchard 5 Johns 508
(NY 1808); Gray v Pentland 2 Serg&R 23 (Penn 1815)
(appointed officers); Law v Scott 5 Har&J 438 (Md 1822)
(candidate for appointive office).
Although we have no occasion to consider it, courts
with little variation, seem to have adopted the rule that fair
accounts of judicial proceedings were not actionable, but
commentary in such reports was. Typical examples are:
Thomas v Croswell 7 Johns 264, 272-3 (NY 1810); The
State v Lehre 4 Hall's AmLJ 48, 55 (SC 1811). Cf: Paul P
Ashley Say It Safely 50-51 (Seattle 1969); Phelps Libel 126.
14

Mayrant v Richardson 1Nott & McC 347,352-3 (SC 1815).
But see Lewis v Few Anthon's NP 102, 5 Johns 1 (NY
1808). Cf Van Vechten v Hopkins 5 Johns 211 (NY 1809).
The outcome in Lewis may have been related to the fact
that that the plaintiff was governor of the state. A similar
situation arose in Bishop v The Cincinnati Gazette Company 4 WkIyLB 1082 (Ohio 1880). Other early New York
cases with political overtones include: Genet v Mitchell 7
Johns 120 (NY 1810), Spencer v Southwick 9 Johns 314,
10 Johns 259 (NY 1812), Coleman v Southwick 9 Johns 45
(NY 1812), Southwick v Stevens 10 Johns 443 (NY 1813).
The first involved a widely-known French minister to the
United States, and the last three a prominent Republican
journalist.

15 Badgley v Hedges 2 NUL (1 Penning) 217, 217, 220 (1807).
16 Dictum in Bunton v Worley 7 Ky (4 Bibb) 38, 38-9 (1815);
see also Hardin v Cumstock 9 Ky (2 Marsh) 480 (1820).
Holdings in: Bodwell v Osgood 20 Mass 379 (1825) (letter
to school committee; malice defined as knowing falsity);
Milam v Burnsides 1 Brev 295 (SC 1803) (charges to a
court martial; malice defined as no probable cause).
17 The Sullivan court said (Sullivan, 283 at note 23):
We have no occasion here to determine how far down
into the lower ranks of government employees the
"public official" designation would extend.
No cases in this period could be found in which an otherwise meritorious claim of privilege was overturned on the
ground that the plaintiff was too low-ranking an official. On
the other hand, the number of government employees has
swelled considerably since 1896.
18 See Knapp & Company v Campbell 14 TexCivAppRep
199 (1896) and Mott v Dawson 46 Iowa 533 (1877)
(slander). See also Van Vechten Verder Freedom OfPublic Discussion23 HarvLRev 413, 417-9 (1910).
19 Barr v Moore 87 PaStRep 385, 388 (1878). The plaintiff
won his case, however.
20 Struthers v Peacock 11 PhilRep 287,293 (1876). Bearce v
Bass 88 Me (8 Hamlin) 521, 543 (1896).

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31
32
33

34

35
36
37
38

39
40
41

42
43
44

Walker v Hawley 16 A 674 (1888).
Id at 676.
Odgers Law, supra note 7 at 51.
Miller v Krabb 5 PaCoRep 636 (1887).
Burt v Advertiser Newspaper Company 154 Mass 238,242
(1891).
Crane v Waters 10 F 619 (CCMass 1882) at 620. But see
Wilson v Fitch 41 Calif 363, 382 (1871).
Smith v Tribune Company 4 Biss 477, 480 (CC NorthDIll)
(1867). The plaintiff won his case, however.
Gott v Pulsifer 122 Mass 235, 239 (1877).
Blakeslee & Sons v Carroll 64 Conn 223, 301 (1894).
See, for example, Randall v The Evening News Association 79 Mich 266, 275 (1890), and Hand v Winton 39
NJLRep (9 Vroom) 123 (1875). Cf Young v Clegg 93 Ind
371 (1883).
McGinnis v George Knapp & Company 18 SW 1134
(1892).
Id at 1138.
Curtis v Mussey 6 Gray 261, 273 (Mass 1856) impropriety
of a judge); Sanderson v Caldwell 45 NY 398 (1871) (extortionate lawyer fees); Hetherington v Sterry 28 Kan 426
(1882) (improper resignation of city attorney); Bourresseau v The Detroit Evening Journal Company 63 Mich (5
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in the literature. Clifton 0 Lawhorne Defamation And
Public Officials (Carbondale 111 1971) says, at 90, that the
privilege "was recognized to some extent or another by a
great majority of states before the twentieth century." His
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